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I. INTRODUCTION
Ademption by extinction has been a thorn in the side of policyminded lawmakers for centuries. A common-law doctrine, ademption
applies when an item of real or personal property that a testator specifically bequeaths is no longer owned by him or her at death.1
Under the doctrine, the bequest “adeems” (i.e. is extinguished) and
the beneficiary takes nothing in lieu of the absent property. Because
many years may pass between will execution and a testator’s death, circumstances—and property—are bound to change. A testator could, for
example, sell a residence and buy a new one, or she might exchange
stock for a different investment vehicle, or she might incorporate a family business—all occurring without an update to her will. Sometimes
these choices are natural evolutions occurring with the passage of time;
sometimes they result from the recommendation of a trusted advisor.
* Attorney, Withers Bergman LLP. B.A. 2004 California Polytechnic State University, J.D. 2018 University of San Diego School of Law. My thanks to Adam J. Hirsch for
helpful comments, and to Darrin W. Miller and Robert A. and Laura J. Paschoal for their
love and support.
1 Mary Kay Lundwall, The Case Against the Ademption by Extinction Rule: A Proposal for Reform, 29 GONZ. L. REV. 105, 106 (1993).
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Regardless of the reason for the change, if the testator fails to update his
or her estate plan the results can be disastrous.
Consider the New York case of Ms. Harris, who devised her home
at 31 Maple Street to a close friend.2 Subsequent to the execution of her
will, but prior to her death, the home was taken in condemnation proceedings, and, as a result, she purchased a new home at 79 Maple Street,
yet her will remained unchanged.3 Ms. Harris died owning the second
property.4 A troubled Surrogate’s Court of New York stated it had “exhausted every avenue it could think of without success” and “reluctantly” held the property adeemed.5 The Court reasoned the second
property could not be substituted for the first because the property
owned at death was not of the one described in the will.6 The harsh
result: the home at 79 Maple escheated to the state because not only did
the devise to the friend fail, but there were no identifiable heirs to take
by intestacy.7
In order to mitigate the harsh effects of ademption, lawmakers have
developed a number of exceptions to the doctrine. One of these, pioneered by the authors of the Uniform Probate Code (“UPC”), is the
“replacement property doctrine.” UPC section 2-606(a) states that “a
specific devisee has a right to specifically devised property in the testator’s estate at the testator’s death and to . . . (5) any real property or
tangible personal property owned by the testator at death which the testator acquired as a replacement for specifically devised real property or
tangible personal property.”8 The authors of the UPC carved out this
exception from the general rule of ademption in order to effectuate testator intent in a circumstance where intent is relatively clear. Nonetheless, the replacement property doctrine, together with its historical
antecedents, remains controversial. Applying the rule in practice has
proven difficult. Whether newly acquired property does or does not
function to replace former property can turn on subtle distinctions that
render consistent application of the rule elusive.
In the pages following, I will examine the problem of replacement
property in the law of ademption. First, through an analysis of replacement property case law and exceptions, I will reveal the arbitrary application of the existing doctrine. Second, I will propose a refined UPC
replacement property exception that includes a factor based test de2
3
4
5
6
7
8

In re Estate of Harris, 414 N.Y.S.2d 835, 836 (Sur. Ct. 1979).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 839.
Id. at 838.
Id. at 839.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-606(a)(5) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
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signed to help courts determine whether current property really is a “replacement” for former property in order to better effectuate testator
intent. Also, because the existing UPC exception does not, by its express
terms, cover intangibles,9 I will advocate extending the exception to include intangible personal property. Third, I will apply the proposed factors in the refined exception to an existing replacement property case in
order to illustrate its virtues.
II. THE IDENTITY THEORY AND EXCEPTIONS
TO THE RULE
A. Historical Background
Under the Justinian Code of Rome, which eventually grew into
early English common law, the testator’s intention to adeem (or not
adeem) a specific gift was considered the controlling principle.10 Extrinsic evidence of all relevant facts and circumstances occurring between
will execution and the testator’s death were admissible to establish a
testator’s intention at the time property was transferred, exchanged, or
sold.11 As a result, courts could be led down an endless rabbit hole of
testimony. Eventually, limitless inquiry into testator intention came to
appear impracticable and the law evolved vis-à-vis two English cases
decided by Lord Chancellor Thurlow late in the eighteenth century.
In Ashburner v. MacGuire,12 Lord Thurlow held that a gift adeems
if the thing bequeathed does not exist in the estate at the time of a testator’s death.13 Three years later in Stanley v. Potter,14 he refined his prior
holding by declaring a testator’s intent, following a change in the property, to be irrelevant.15 Occasionally known as Lord Thurlow’s rule, but
more commonly called the “identity theory,” this scheme merely requires a two-part in specie test to resolve the question of ademption: (1)
determine whether the devise is specific, and (2) determine whether the
property still exists in the testator’s estate at death. The in specie test
does not consider testator intent and the result is the same whether the
property is deliberately or inadvertently exchanged, lost, or destroyed.16
Inevitably, a rule of ademption that ignores intent is bound to defeat
9

Id. (confining the exception to real property and tangible personal property).
Pepka v. Branch, 294 N.E.2d 141, 150-51 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973); see also William H.
Page, Ademption by Extinction: Its Practical Effects, 1943 WIS. L. REV. 11, 14 (1943)
(discussing the origins of ademption by extinction).
11 See Pepka, 294 N.E.2d at 151.
12 Ashburner v. MacGuire (1786) 29 Eng. Rep. 62; 2 Bro. C.C. 108.
13 Id. at 110.
14 Stanley v. Potter (1789) 30 Eng. Rep. 3; 2 Cox 180.
15 Id. at 182.
16 Lundwall, supra note 1, at 108.
10
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intent. Over time it became clear that Lord Thurlow’s simple two-part
test often did frustrate the intent of testators, contrary to the larger
framework of inheritance law. Dissatisfied with the rule and reluctant to
follow it, lawmakers and judges began to develop a number of ways to
avoid its application.17
The judicial escape devices adopted by courts include a preference
for general devises over specific devises, date of death construction, and
the change in form principle. Courts construe bequests as general or
demonstrative rather than specific because the law of ademption applies
only to specific devises. Whenever the language of the will permits such
construction, a court can classify a bequest as general and avoid ademption by extinction.18 Date of death construction allows courts to interpret the testator’s will as of the date of death and not as of the date of
the will’s execution.19 As a result, a beneficiary may get the property
owned by the testator at death even if the testator sold or replaced such
property several times during her lifetime.20
The change in form principle is the most common judicial escape
device and is applied when there has been a change in the property between will execution and the testator’s death.21 This court-created test
looks to the type or extent of the transformation.22 A mere formal
change in the bequest will not trigger ademption, but if the gift has
changed in substance, the bequest is adeemed.23 Today, the majority of
identity theory jurisdictions use the form and substance test to resolve
the issue of replacement property. As the comment to UPC section 2606 observes, the replacement property exception under subsection
(a)(5) represents a mere extension of the change in form principle.24
Because the form and substance test is the primary method used to address ademption in identity theory states, its application warrants further analysis.
B. The Form and Substance Test
The form and substance test is a judicially created test used to help
courts evaluate whether specifically devised property has adeemed. For
the purpose of this article, the test is relevant to the extent that a major17

Id. at 109-10.
Page, supra note 10, at 27.
19 Lundwall, supra note 1, at 113.
20 Id.
21 Joseph Warren, The History of Ademption, 25 IOWA L. REV. 290, 319 (1940).
22 See id.
23 Pepka v. Branch, 294 N.E.2d 141, 152 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973).
24 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-606 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (“Subsection
(a)(5) does not import a tracing principle into the question of ademption, but rather
should be seen as a sensible ‘mere change in form’ principle.”).
18
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ity of courts are using the test to give effect tacitly to changes which are
replacement property. Historically, the test was based on metaphysical
existences, focusing on whether the property in question was still substantially the same as that devised in the will. If a specifically devised
asset was not in the testator’s estate in its original form, the gift did not
fail if the asset still existed in a modified form; however, case law has
established that only insubstantial changes will pass muster.25 For instance, a mere change in location of the asset is usually treated as a
change in form, but if a testator sells the property and only holds the
cash proceeds at death the change will be considered substantial, regardless of whether tracing is possible.26 Using this vague insubstantial versus substantial test, courts are tasked with determining at what point the
subject matter of a gift has changed so much that it is no longer substantially the same thing, i.e. it is extinguished.27 Courts often look to several factors, but exactly what qualifies as a “change in substance” to
trigger ademption fluctuates between jurisdictions.
Akins v. Clark28 illustrates the form and substance test as applied in
the context of real property. In Akins, the testator devised a farm and
stock to her close friend; however, after executing the will she transferred both to a limited partnership.29 Following the testator’s death, the
trial court held that the transfer of the farm and stock did not materially
change or alter the assets and therefore no ademption was triggered.30
The court of appeals reversed and held the gift adeemed for three reasons. First, the court argued the transfer changed the character of the
property from real (the farm) to personal (a partnership interest).31 Second, prior to the transfer, the testator owned 100% of the property but
after the transfer she only owned a 91.5% partnership interest.32 Third,
25 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 5.2 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1999) (“Even though a specifically devised asset is not in the
testator’s estate in its original form, the specific devise does not fail if the asset is in the
testator’s estate in a changed form. By well-established authority, the change-in-form
principle applies if the change in form is insubstantial. It is not possible to give a comprehensive list of what types of post-execution transactions amount to a mere change in form
and what types do not. It is clear, however, that if the testator gives the property to the
devisee or to another, the change-in-form principle cannot operate because the testator
has received nothing in return for the gift. The testator’s estate owns no product into
which the subject of the original devise was changed.”).
26 Id. Tracing is the process of tracking property’s ownership or characteristics from
the time of its origin to the present. It is also termed “tracing of funds” or “tracing of
property.” Tracing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2009).
27 See Pepka, 294 N.E.2d at 149.
28 59 S.W.3d 124 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
29 Id. at 125.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 127.
32 Id.
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the court said it was “noteworthy that [testator’s] own conduct resulted
in an ademption by extinction.”33 The court also briefly stated that even
if the testator’s intention was only to transfer the property to save estate
taxes at death, intent is irrelevant for the purpose of ademption.34 This
result seems to defeat probable intent, especially considering the beneficiary of the farm and stock owned the other 8.5% of the partnership.35
These facts could evidence a desire by the testator to provide for the
beneficiary in life and in death.
Akins demonstrates that the court looks to the totality of circumstances in determining whether property has changed in substance. The
court looked at the property’s character, the testator’s percentage of
ownership before and after the change, and whether the change resulted
from voluntary conduct of the testator. While ownership interest and
voluntariness of conduct applied to both the farm and the stock, the
application of a change in character only concerned the farm and not
the stock, as the stock remained personal property before and after the
transfer. Yet, both gifts were adeemed. Arguably, at least the stock
should have passed to the beneficiary.
Moreover, although the Akins court asserted the testator’s own voluntary action was a decisive factor in triggering ademption, the very
next sentence of the opinion noted that an opposite result was reached
in Estate of Hume v. Klank (also a Tennessee case).36 In Hume the gift
was adeemed even though the change in property was the result of a
third party’s conduct and not the voluntary act of the testator.37 In both
Akins and Hume, the same result was reached regardless of whether the
change in property was the voluntary act of the testator. What appeared
to be a relevant and deciding factor in Akins was not afforded the same
weight in Hume. Considering this discrepancy, exactly what triggers a
“substantial enough” change in property is uncertain.
Compare the result in Akins to that in Redditt v. Redditt, a 2002
Mississippi case.38 Redditt involved the transfer of a family farm to a
family corporation after execution of the testator’s will.39 This case was
a bit more complicated than Akins because here, the testator only bequeathed the farm to three of her four children, stating that the excluded child had been “taken care of” during life.40 Consequently,
33
34
35
36

Id. at 128.
Id.
Id. at 126.
Compare id. at 128 with Estate of Hume v. Klank, 984 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tenn.

1999).
37
38
39
40

Estate of Hume, 984 S.W.2d at 605.
820 So. 2d 782 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 785.
Id. at 784.
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following the testator’s death the excluded child argued that incorporation of the farm extinguished the devise and triggered an ademption.41
The court of appeals disagreed and affirmed the lower court’s decision
that conveyance of land to the corporation was a change of form only,
since the substance of the farm remained the same.42
Although not expressly addressed by the court, in both Akins and
Redditt the testator’s property was changed in character from real (the
farmland) to personal property (partnership interest/corporate shares).
The court in Redditt also noted that, analogous to Akins, the testator
transferred the property by voluntary act in order to save estate taxes,43
yet still, the court in Redditt came to the opposite conclusion—no
ademption. These inconsistent results raise the question: why is ademption triggered when real property is transferred to a partnership, but not
when real property is transferred to a corporation? If ademption by extinction is “predicated upon the principle that the subject of the gift is
annihilated or its condition so altered that nothing remains to which the
terms of the bequest can apply,”44 then it cannot rationally be argued
the farm and stock in Akins met this principle while the farm in Redditt
did not. Perhaps Akins was distinguishable because the testator owned
100% of the property before the transfer but only 91.5% after, whereas
in Redditt the testator maintained full ownership. Conceivably, this distinction best resolves the inconsistent outcomes. But attorneys and testators alike should find such unpredictability unsettling—especially
because the beneficiary in Akins owned the other 8.5% of the
partnership.45
Akins and Redditt are far from the only examples of inconsistent
application of the form and substance test. In Pepka v. Branch,46 the
court held that incorporation of a sole proprietorship was not a change
in substance because the testator continued to be the sole owner of the
business, there was no change in operation of the business, and the business assets remained the same.47 Contrast the result in Pepka with the
Louisiana case of Succession of Huguet,48 where the court held an
ademption was triggered when the testator transferred real property to
a partnership.49 The court in Huguet reasoned that once the testator
41

See id. at 787.
See id. at 788 (noting the testator transferred the farm on the advice of her advisor in order to save on estate taxes).
43 Id.
44 Baldwin v. Davidson, 267 S.W.2d 756, 759 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954).
45 Akins v. Clark, 59 S.W.3d 124, 126 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
46 Pepka v. Branch, 294 N.E.2d 141 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973).
47 See id. at 149.
48 Succession of Huguet, 708 So. 2d 1302 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
49 Id. at 1305.
42
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transferred the property to the partnership, she no longer owned the
real property regardless of the fact that she owned 98.36% of the
partnership.50
The most common application of the form and substance test arises
in cases involving intangibles like stocks, bonds, and other investment
vehicles. In this context a more challenging question arises if the testator
replaces the specifically devised property with property of like-kind and
function. A typical example is In re Estate of Dungan,51 where due to a
corporate reorganization a testator was forced to exchange municipal
bonds of one city for those of a different city.52 Despite the fact that the
bonds were undeniably of like-kind and function—the new bonds were
also municipal and of approximately identical amounts to the former
bonds—the court asserted there was no similarity whatsoever.53 Recognizing the grim result, the court still held the bequest of the municipal
bonds adeemed and the beneficiary took nothing.54 Juxtapose Dungan
with In re Estate of Block,55 where the court suggested that a change in
one kind or type of security for another may be considered insubstantial
enough to avoid ademption.56
The theory that a change in investment type is insubstantial is corroborated by Parker v. Bozian,57 Geary v. Geary,58 and Johnston v. Estate of Wheeler.59 In Parker the court held no ademption occurred when
a testator transferred funds from one certificate of deposit (“CD”) to
two different CDs.60 Geary reached a parallel result in holding that a
transfer of funds from one brokerage account to another did not effect
an ademption.61 Relying on prior Tennessee precedent, the Geary court
reasoned the “subject of the legacy ha[d] been substantially preserved.”62 Finally, the Johnston case established that a specific bequest
of investments under a retirement plan offered by an employer was not
50 Id. (holding ademption because Louisiana recognizes the entity theory of partnerships which defines a partnership as a distinct legal entity from the individuals composing
it).
51 62 A.2d 509 (Del. Super. Ct. & Orphans’ Ct. 1948).
52 Id. at 510.
53 Id. at 511.
54 Id.
55 397 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sur. Ct. 1977).
56 Id. at 552 (holding no ademption on other grounds).
57 859 So. 2d 427 (Ala. 2003).
58 275 S.W.3d 835 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008).
59 745 A.2d 345 (D.C. 2000).
60 Parker, 859 So. 2d at 435-36.
61 Geary, 275 S.W.3d at 843.
62 Id. Recall however, that in the Akins case, a contrary result was reached even
though the subject matter of the gift had also been preserved. See supra notes 28-35 and
accompanying text.
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adeemed when the testator rolled the investments over to an IRA.63
The significance of Johnston lies in the court’s reasoning that a change
in account location and a change in funds in which the monies were
invested did not materially alter the nature of the gift.64 In all three
cases the courts primarily focused on the change, or lack thereof, in the
underlying subject matter of the bequest.
Presuming for a moment the courts in Parker, Geary, and Johnston
were correct, then it logically follows that in cases dealing exclusively
with intangibles ademption should not be triggered if the underlying
funds and the purpose of the investment remain constant. Dungan could
then be distinguished because when the first bonds were called in new
bonds had to be purchased; as a result, the subject matter was no longer
the same. Nevertheless, this theory fails when considering the Ohio case
of Church v. Morgan,65 where the testator, within hours of executing her
will, transferred the funds of a specifically devised bank account to a CD
for a higher rate of interest.66 The subject matter of the bequest was the
same—the funds were simply transferred from the bank account to the
CD within the same bank—but the change was considered substantial
enough to constitute an ademption. The court based its decision on the
fact that the funds were no longer in the specific bank account at
death.67 Therefore, although the money in the CD was the same money
that was in the specifically bequeathed bank account, the gift adeemed
because it was not in the same location.
Existing case law demonstrates a clear problem with the form and
substance test: unpredictability. The results are not continuously unpredictable when confined to a particular state applying the test, but the
test as a whole is applied inconsistently across identity theory jurisdictions. Throughout the myriad of cases applying the form and substance
test, at least fourteen different factors could be identified as relevant to
the analysis of whether a change in substance had occurred.68 The con63

Johnston, 745 A.2d at 347.
Id. at 352.
65 Church v. Morgan, 685 N.E.2d 809 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
66 Id. at 810.
67 Id. at 811.
68 Factors discussed by courts as relevant to the analysis of ademption include:
whether the change was the result of advice by an advisor, whether the property was of
like character, whether the change was “nominal,” whether the change was the result of
an exchange or a sale of the property, whether funds from the first property were used to
acquire the subsequent property, whether there was a change in ownership amount or
percentage, whether there was a change in how the testator exercised dominion over the
property, whether (in the context of a business) the operations of the business remained
the same, whether the change was the voluntary act of the testator, whether there was
evidence the testator considered the new property as different, whether there was a
change in investment location, whether there was a change in the location of the invest64
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sequence is a vague totality of the circumstances approach in which the
factors to be evaluated in any given case are chosen at random. What
one court finds relevant another court may not even consider. Therefore, it is evident, at least in the context of replacement property, the
form and substance test does not go far enough to prevent the “endless
uncertainty and confusion” Lord Thurlow’s identity theory endeavored
to avoid.69
One alternative is for states to return to the intent theory. Eight
jurisdictions—Arkansas,70 California,71 Florida,72 Illinois,73 Kansas,74
Kentucky,75 Missouri,76 and Montana77—have already done so either by
legislation or decisional law. Another option is to adopt the UPC replacement property exception.
C. The Uniform Probate Code Replacement Property Exception
In an effort to address the harsh results of the identity theory, UPC
section 2-606 was revised in 1990. One major theme of the 1990 revision
was the rejection of formalism in favor of intent effectuating policies.78
This renewed focus on testator intent led to the addition of subsection
(a)(5) which added an exception for nonademption in the instances
where a testator replaced an item of property with other property.79
Introduction of the replacement property exception was a step in
the right direction. Nonetheless, the new exception failed to clarify what
exactly qualifies as replacement property. The comment to UPC section
2-606 provides little in the way of guidance, noting only that subsection
(a)(5) is not a tracing test, but is instead an extension of the change in
form principle.80 The example provided is that of a testator who bement or property, the time elapsed between disposing of the former property and acquiring the new property, and the ability of the executor to carry out the bequest. For a
discussion of the most relevant of these factors, see infra Part III.A.
69 Lundwall, supra note 1, at 107 (quoting Humphreys v. Humphreys (1789) 30 Eng.
Rep. 85; 2 Cox 184).
70 ARKANSAS CIRCUIT COURTS JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK PROBATE DIVISION, PROBATE B ENCHBOOK 15 (2014), https://www.arcourts.gov/sites/default/files/Probate
Benchbook.pdf.
71 CAL. PROB. CODE § 21400 (West 2019).
72 FLA. STAT. § 732.609 (2019).
73 Sorensen v. First Nat’l Bank of Chi., 376 N.E.2d 18 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
74 In re Estate of Graham, 533 P.2d 1318, 1321-23 (Kan. 1975).
75 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.360 (West 2019).
76 Fid. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Hovey, 5 S.W.2d 437, 441-42, 446-47 (Mo. 1928).
77 MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-616 (2019).
78 Gregory S. Alexander, Ademption and the Domain of Formality in Wills Law, 55
ALB. L. REV. 1067, 1067 (1992).
79 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-606(a)(5) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
80 Id. § 2-606(a)(5) cmt.
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queaths a specific car, and, after executing her will, sells that car and
buys another different car. Applied properly, subsection (a)(5) ensures
that the beneficiary takes the replacement car regardless of make,
model, or year.81 But if the testator sells the specifically bequeathed car
and buys mutual funds instead of a replacement car, then the bequest
fails and the beneficiary takes nothing.82 The comment’s example suggests that new property of like-kind to the former property should be
considered a replacement. At least in a case analogous to Harris, discussed supra,83 the UPC exception would avoid ademption. However, it
is less clear whether the exception applies in situations that do not involve like-kind property such as the transfer of farm and stock to a partnership in the Akins case. Additionally, the exception provides no relief
from the traditional identity approach in cases involving intangibles.
Addition of the replacement property exception to the UPC
prompted two states—South Dakota and Georgia—to codify their own
variations of the exception. In South Dakota, a specific devisee has a
right to the specifically devised property in the testator’s estate at death
and . . . (5) property owned by the testator at death if it is “evident from
the circumstances” that the testator intended the property to be distributed as a replacement for specifically devised property.84 Similar to the
UPC exception, the South Dakota statute provides no guidance on what
constitutes replacement property, nor does it clarify what evidence is
admissible to determine testator intent from the circumstances.
In Georgia, if a testator exchanges property that is the subject of a
specific testamentary gift for other property of “like character,” or
merely “changes the investment of a fund,” the testator’s intention is
construed as meaning to substitute the one for the other, and the testamentary gift does not fail.85 Unlike the UPC exception, this statute
clearly extends to intangibles such as investment funds. But the Georgia
exception is still vulnerable to criticism by those who believe it is overly
specific. For example, one author observed that “if such statute is enacted in order to give effect to the probable intention of the testator, it
would seem that his intention would be the same whether in exchange
for . . . [the] specifically devised [gift], he got another thing of like character, or a thing of an entirely different character.”86 This critique may
not be far-fetched. In a 2005 Georgia case, Fletcher v. Ellenburg,87 the
81

Id.
Id.
83 See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
84 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-606(a)(5) (2019).
85 GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-67 (West 2019).
86 Lundwall, supra note 1, at 120 (citing William H. Page, Ademption by Extinction:
Its Practical Effects, 1943 WIS. L. REV. 11, 34 (1943)).
87 609 S.E.2d 337 (Ga. 2005).
82
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testatrix, Ms. Hyde, executed a will devising a one story house and the
tract of land on which it was built to her niece.88 Nearly twenty years
after devising the property, she sold it and purchased a second property
of like character—a tract of land with a one story brick house.89 Ms.
Hyde died without updating her will as to the property and, notwithstanding a replacement property exception in the Georgia Code, the
Georgia Supreme Court unanimously held the gift to the niece was
adeemed by extinction.90 The court based its decision on whether the
second property could be considered a substitute for the first and found
that because the first property was used as an investment and the second
was used as a residence, the latter was not a substitute for the first.91
Fletcher exemplifies the difficult challenge faced by courts in determining whether a second property can be a replacement—or a substitute—
for the first.
Twenty-eight years have passed since the 1990 revision of the UPC.
Presently, only five jurisdictions have adopted UPC section 2606(a)(5).92 The inadequate adoption of replacement property exceptions is disconcerting because the majority of jurisdictions continue to
resolve the issue using the vague form and substance test. These jurisdictions endeavor to avoid the morass that Lord Thurlow thought to escape
by adhering to the traditional identity theory and ignoring testator intent. But in certain circumstances testator intent is clearer and
lawmakers in jurisdictions that recognize exceptions do so because they
can infer intent in those situations more easily. The UPC replacement
property exception combines the simple identity theory test with a limited exception for circumstances in which application of the identity theory test would almost certainly defeat the testator’s intent.
The lackluster response to the UPC exception may be a result of its
description as an extension of the change in form principle. If a state
applying the form and substance test finds the UPC exception to be a
comparable method, why bother turning the legislative wheel to adopt
it? Additionally, in its current form the UPC exception could prove just
as mercurial as the form and substance test. Merely to call something a
“replacement” is vague. For example, must the replacement property be
of the same character? Must it be of the same value? Does timing of
conversion play a role in the decision? Without more guidance, what
88

Id. at 338.
Id.
90 Id. at 340.
91 Id.
92 COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-606 (2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2606 (2019);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-616 (2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-606 (2019); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 75-2-606 (LexisNexis 2018).
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qualifies as replacement property will continue to be problematic. The
UPC exception would benefit from refinement to add clarity and
predictability.
III. THE UPC EXCEPTION: A PROPOSAL FOR
A “CHANGE IN FORM”
A. The Factor Based Test
In general, the policy of wills law is to effectuate intent, and a revised UPC replacement property exception will help achieve that goal.
Inclusion of a factor based test would make replacement property
clearer and more predictable, providing guidance for judges to help
them resolve the issue in a way calculated to carry out a testator’s intent.
The existing UPC replacement property exception fails to provide adequate parameters for determining what qualifies as replacement property. As previously noted, courts rely on a myriad of factors when
applying the form and substance test.93 Drawing from these factors, I
have identified the five most relevant ones to be included in a refined
UPC exception. The recommended factors include (1) whether the conversion of the property was voluntary or involuntary; (2) whether the
conversion of the property was recommended by an advisor; (3)
whether the current property was acquired simultaneously or soon after
the conversion of the former property; (4) whether the current property
has a value similar to the former property; and (5) whether the current
property is similar in kind to the former property. No single factor in the
refined statute is intended to be outcome determinative. Instead all five
factors ought to be considered with the most weight placed on those that
best help a court effectuate testator intent in the particular circumstances. Each factor is explained in further detail below.
(1) Whether the conversion of the property was voluntary or
involuntary.
Whether or not the conversion of the property is the result of voluntary conduct by the testator can indicate testator intent. If the act is
involuntary then it is less likely to reflect a change of intent by the testator. This element is implicit in UPC section 2-606(b) relating to the sale
or mortgage of property by a conservator or by an agent acting within
the authority of a durable power of attorney for an incapacitated principal.94 Under this exception, the involuntary nature of the act paired with
93

See supra note 68.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-606(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (“If specifically devised property is sold or mortgaged by a conservator or by an agent acting within the
authority of a durable power of attorney for an incapacitated principal, or a condemna94
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the testator’s incapacity indicates that the change in the property was
not a manifestation of the testator’s intent to alter an existing bequest.95
Because an involuntary act by a testator is germane to the ademption analysis, it logically follows that voluntary conduct is also relevant.
For example, in Kelly v. Nielson,96 the court held a voluntary sale by a
testatrix prior to her death, but that was not completed until after her
death due to circumstances beyond her control, adeemed the bequest of
the property.97 The court reasoned that the testatrix took every step
necessary to effectuate the sale prior to her death and that refusing to
recognize ademption would have disrupted the testatrix’s dispositive
scheme.98 In Kelly, the testatrix was fully aware the sale extinguished
the gift, she continued with the sale, and she chose not to purchase property to replace the property sold.99 Therefore, when objectively considered, the voluntary (or involuntary) acts of a testator do evidence intent
and should be included in any ademption analysis.
(2) Whether the conversion of the property was recommended by
an advisor.
When a testator converts property solely in response to recommendations of an advisor, it is unlikely he or she intended the conversion to
have an effect on the estate plan. Such changes are usually made to save
estate taxes or otherwise improve the return on an investment. The testator is typically motivated by reasons that are completely unrelated to
his or her estate plan.
For example, the 2017 case of Steinberg v. Steinberg100 involved the
exchange of previously bequeathed real property in a like-kind tax exchange.101 Focusing on the fact that the exact property bequeathed was
tion award, insurance proceeds, or recovery for injury to the property is paid to a conservator or to an agent acting within the authority of a durable power of attorney for an
incapacitated principal, the specific devisee has the right to a general pecuniary devise
equal to the net sale price, the amount of the unpaid loan, the condemnation award, the
insurance proceeds, or the recovery.”).
95 See Walsh v. Gillespie, 154 N.E.2d 906, 910 (Mass. 1959) (holding that the sale by
a conservator of one-half of the shares of stock bequeathed in her will did not operate as
an ademption of the specific bequest as to the unexpended balance of the proceeds remaining in the conservator’s hands at the testatrix’s death. The sale of the stock, the
largest asset of the estate, had been necessary for the testatrix’s support. If adeemed, this
asset would not have benefited “the principal objects of the testatrix’s bounty,” a result
the court declined to sanction.).
96 745 N.E.2d 952 (Mass. 2001).
97 Id. at 960.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 894 N.W.2d 463 (Iowa 2017).
101 Id. at 465 (the property at issue was held in a family living trust).
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no longer in the estate, the Iowa Supreme Court declined to recognize
an exception for like-kind tax exchanges and held the gift was adeemed
by extinction.102 The court’s decision resulted in one son receiving his
specific devise plus one half of the adeemed property, while the second
son received only one half of the adeemed property.103 The facts in
Steinberg indicated the testator intended to provide for both sons
equally when he bequeathed one property to each. Nevertheless, the
identity theory thwarted the testator’s intent when it unjustly enriched
one son at the detriment of the other.
From a policy perspective it is difficult to imagine that a testator
intends to engineer a change in his estate plan when he or she executes a
like-kind tax exchange for investment purposes. Likely, the testator has
no idea his actions might trigger an ademption. On the contrary, advisor
recommended conversions likely reflect a testator’s desire to increase
the value of his property, thereby enhancing the gift to the beneficiary.
Increasing the value of the gift is evidence of a reaffirmed intention to
make the gift, not to adeem it. For these reasons, whether the conversion of the property was recommended by an advisor is relevant to any
determination of ademption.104
(3) Whether the current property was acquired simultaneously or
soon after the conversion of the former property.
In assessing whether current property is meant to be a replacement
for the former property, case law has shown that timing is significant.
Rapidity might suggest a greater likelihood that the testator conceptualized the new property as replacing the old. If this is true, then the testator likely intends the beneficiary to take the current property in lieu of
the former.
Recall in Harris, the testatrix’s home was condemned and as a result she purchased a second home on the same street in New York.105
The court noted the importance of the fact that the testatrix used the
funds from the first home to buy the second and that the second was
purchased less than thirty days after the first home was officially condemned.106 Although the timing of the conversion was undoubtedly relevant, the court ultimately held the gift of the property adeemed on
102

Id. at 471.
Id.
104 Compare Redditt v. Redditt, 820 So. 2d 782, 787 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (noting the
transfer of assets to a corporation for the purpose of decreasing estate taxes as relevant to
the determination of ademption) with Akins v. Clark, 59 S.W.3d 124, 125 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2001) (arguing a testator’s intent to save taxes as irrelevant).
105 In re Estate of Harris, 414 N.Y.S.2d 835, 836 (Sur. Ct. 1979).
106 Id. at 836.
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other grounds.107 Additionally, in Fletcher, the court considered significant the fact that over a year had passed between the sale of the first
property and the purchase of the second.108 Although not expressly
stated in Fletcher, the court suggested that a long passage of time might
indicate a testator’s intent to adeem a gift. Cases involving tangible and
intangible personal property also support the inclusion of a factor that
weighs the timing between acquisition of current property and conversion of the former property.109
(4) Whether the current property has a value similar to the
former property.
Equivalent value at the time of conversion may suggest a greater
likelihood that the testator intended the new property to replace the
old. In analyzing this factor, courts should focus on rough-equivalence
of value at the time of the conversion, keeping in mind that specific
bequests can always fluctuate in value after a will is executed.
Value comparisons between current and former property appear repeatedly in cases decided by jurisdictions using the form and substance
test. Courts applying the form and substance test often look to the value
of property to determine whether a material change has occurred (i.e.
whether the gift has changed to such an extent it has been extinguished).
In Geary, discussed supra, a testator transferred investments from one
brokerage account to another.110 Holding that no ademption occurred,
the court justified the decision by reasoning that the contents of the new
account were the same as the old and had not been “liquidated, added
to, disposed of, or otherwise substantially changed.”111 A similar result
was reached in Parker where the court focused on the fact that the funds
in the original CD were not withdrawn, added to, or otherwise changed,
but were simply transferred to another account and split into two CDs
of equal value.112
107 Id. at 838 (declining to consider an argument of “substituted premises,” the court
held the property adeemed because the premises owned at death were not those described in the will.).
108 Fletcher v. Ellenburg, 609 S.E.2d 337, 340 (Ga. 2005).
109 See generally Welch v. Welch, 113 So. 197, 198 (Miss. 1927) (recognizing the exchange of one vehicle for another may indicate the testator intended the second vehicle
to replace the first, but holding ademption on other grounds); Church v. Morgan, 685
N.E.2d 809, 810-11 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (conceding that the simultaneous transfer of
funds in a specifically bequeathed bank account to a CD at the same bank might indicate
the testatrix intended the bequest to remain the same).
110 Geary v. Geary, 275 S.W.3d 835, 836 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008).
111 Id. at 843 (arguing the “contents” of the first account still existed in the second
account, specifically the same four municipal bonds and a small amount of cash and cash
equivalents).
112 Parker v. Bozian, 859 So. 2d 427, 436 (Ala. 2003) (holding nonademption).
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Value can also be defined as percentage of ownership. This becomes relevant in cases involving the transfer of real property to a partnership or corporation, or in cases where a business is incorporated. For
example, in Akins, the value of the testator’s interest in a farm and stock
decreased from 100% to 91.5%.113 The court argued this change was
significant enough to trigger ademption.114 Equivalent value was also a
pertinent consideration by the court in Arenofsky v. Arenofsky,115
where a testator exchanged his partnership interest for corporate
shares.116 Focusing on the value and number of shares as compared to
the partnership interest, the court held the transfer did not adeem the
bequest.117
(5) Whether the current property is similar in kind to the former
property.
Property of similar kind may suggest a greater likelihood the testator envisioned the new property as a replacement for the former property. From the standpoint of intent, the more similar in kind
replacement property is, the more likely the testator intends one as a
substitute for the other. This is likely substantiated by the fact that
whether property is similar in kind is one of the most frequently
weighed factors in replacement property cases. For instance, in Fletcher
the court evaluated the property’s like character (real property) and like
use (residence versus rental property) when deciding if current property
was a substitute for the former.118 In Thompson v. Mathews,119 the court
primarily focused on the property’s like character (both properties were
farm land) when holding that no ademption occurred.120 And recall that
in Akins, the change from real property to a partnership interest was of
utmost importance to the court.121
The dominance of this factor is likely attributable to the form and
substance test. Under the form and substance test, whether replacement
113

Akins v. Clark, 59 S.W.3d 124, 127 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
Id.
115 102 A.2d 101 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1954).
116 Id. at 103.
117 Id. at 104.
118 Fletcher v. Ellenburg, 609 S.E.2d 337, 340 (Ga. 2005).
119 174 S.E.2d 916 (Ga. 1970).
120 Id. at 918 (holding the exchange of property of like character did not cause an
ademption); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-67 (West 2019) (“If the testator exchanges property
which is the subject of a specific testamentary gift for other property of like character, or
merely changes the investment of a fund so given, the testator’s intention shall be
deemed to be to substitute the one for the other, and the testamentary gift shall not
fail.”).
121 See Akins v. Clark, 59 S.W.3d 124 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
114
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property is similar in kind is extremely relevant to whether property has
changed in substance. Examples include, but are not limited to, a transfer of real property to a partnership or a corporation,122 the exchange of
a mortgage note for the underlying real property,123 the incorporation
of a sole proprietorship,124 and the exchange of real property for
stock.125
Moreover, the importance of the similar in kind analysis is implicit
in the current UPC exception. The comment under UPC section 2-606
includes an example of a testator who exchanges a car for mutual funds
to illustrate a conversion beyond the scope of the replacement property
exception.126 Although not expressly stated, this example demonstrates
that whether property is similar in kind is relevant to determining what
qualifies as replacement property. The repeated use as well as the substantial weight accorded the similar in kind analysis strongly support its
inclusion in a refined UPC exception.
B. The Refined Replacement Property Exception
Refinement of the UPC exception to include the aforementioned
factors is the first step. The second is to extend the exception to intangibles. Because no sentiment attaches to intangibles, there is an even
greater likelihood that the testator sought to bequeath value to the beneficiary, and would therefore want the beneficiary to receive something
in lieu of the original bequest. Furthermore, case law demonstrates
courts are already applying the form and substance test to intangibles.
Consequently, reforming the UPC exception to extend to intangibles
may remedy the uneven application and inconsistent results of existing
doctrine. Thus, a refined UPC section 2-606(a) statute might read:
(a) A specific devisee has a right to specifically devised property in the testator’s estate at the testator’s death and to:
(5) any real property, . . . tangible personal property,
or intangible personal property owned by the testator at
death which the testator acquired as a replacement for spe122 See Lang v. Vaughn, 74 S.E. 270, 274 (Ga. 1912) (holding stock and real property
are not of like character).
123 See Green v. Green, 58 S.E.2d 722, 724 (N.C. 1950) (holding a change in character
from a security interest to absolute ownership of the property mortgaged adeemed the
legacy).
124 See Akins, 59 S.W.3d at 124 (holding a transfer of real property to a partnership
was a change in substance). But see Pepka v. Branch, 294 N.E.2d 141, 156 (Ind. Ct. App.
1973) (holding the incorporation of a business was not a change in character).
125 See Redditt v. Redditt, 820 So. 2d 782 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (holding a transfer of
real property to a corporation did not change the substance of the bequest).
126 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-606 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
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cifically devised real property, . . . tangible personal property, or intangible personal property;
...
(f) For purposes of determining whether property qualifies as
replacement property under subsection (a)(5), the relevant
factors include:
(1) Whether the conversion of the property was voluntary or
involuntary;
(2) Whether the conversion of the property was recommended by an advisor;
(3) Whether the current property was acquired simultaneously or soon after the conversion of the former property;
(4) Whether the current property has a value similar to the
former property; and
(5) Whether the current property is similar in kind to the
former property
The proposed refinement of the UPC replacement property exception is evolutionary rather than revolutionary. The revision aims to synthesize the best parts of existing case law into a uniform test to increase
predictability. Revisiting one of the most unsatisfactory decisions, Akins
v. Clark, and applying the new exception helps to illustrate its prospective utility.
C. Applying The Refined Exception
Recall that in Akins the testator converted farm and stock to a limited partnership after executing her will.127 The question was whether
the testator’s interest in the partnership qualified as replacement property. In analyzing the case under the refined UPC exception, the facts
should be applied to each of the five relevant factors and no one factor
will be considered dispositive of the testator’s intent to adeem (or not
adeem) the bequest in question.
Factors one and two appear to be satisfied because, although the
testator transferred the property to the partnership voluntarily, she did
so on the recommendation of an advisor to save estate taxes.128 If the
purpose of the transfer was to decrease potential estate taxes, thus ensuring the bequest is of greater value to the beneficiary, then a court
may feel confident inferring nonademption. The tax motivation behind
the transfer is also evidence the testator did not intend to engineer a
change in his estate plan or cause a specific bequest to adeem.
127
128

Akins v. Clark, 59 S.W.3d 124, 126 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
See id. at 127-28.
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The third factor requires a consideration of timing. In Akins the
conversion occurred simultaneously with the transfer of the property to
the partnership. Under the fourth factor a court should consider
whether the partnership interest is of equivalent value to the original
property. Prior to conversion the testator owned 100% of the farm and
stock, but after the conversion she owned 91.5%.129 The testator still
maintained the controlling share of the partnership, and one could argue
specific bequests always fluctuate in value from the time of will execution to the time of death. Therefore, the forfeiture of 8.5% of the value
upon conversion, when considered with the four other factors, may not
be determinative. Nevertheless, there is no bright line rule, and courts
will eventually dictate when a loss is so substantial that it triggers
ademption.
Finally, the fifth factor asks courts to consider whether the new
property is similar in kind to the former property. In Akins, there was an
unquestionable conversion of real property to intangible personal property. If similar character alone triggered ademption, then the beneficiary
in Akins would have no hope at success. However, the fifth factor asks
courts to consider whether the property is similar in kind when defining
replacement property, not whether the property holds the same character. From the standpoint of intent, it would seem that the more “similar”—both in value and in kind—replacement property is, the more
likely the testator viewed it as a substitute. Here, the use and function of
the farm as well as the stock remained the same.130 The business also
continued in the same manner because the testator’s controlling interest
in the partnership ensured operation and management would remain
consistent. The formal characteristics of the replacement property may
not be identical, but the underlying subject matter, the farm business,
remained the same.
IV. CONCLUSION
Current jurisprudence includes an abundance of evidence corroborating the arbitrary application of the existing replacement property doctrine. The danger, however, is not only in inconsistent and
arbitrary results, but also in the harsh consequence of ademption, particularly in cases where it is clear testator intent was frustrated. From a
policy perspective, limited exceptions in circumstances where testator
intent is more clearly identifiable can help courts avoid the draconian
results of the law of ademption. Moreover, limited exceptions are theoretically justified because where testator intent is discernible such exceptions ensure judicial economy and limit adjudicative costs.
129
130

Id. at 127.
Id. at 128.
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The current UPC replacement property exception, as an extension
of the change in form principle, provides insufficient relief because it is
vague and does not cover intangibles. Although there is no bright line
rule for replacement property, the analysis will almost always require
consideration of relevant factors. These factors must be further specified
and applied uniformly in order to ensure predictability for courts, drafting attorneys and testators. In addition, the relevant factors should be
limited in number to maximize consistency in application—a test evaluating the totality of all circumstances is not ideal.
The proposed refinement to UPC section 2-606(a)(5) is a sensible
solution to a centuries-old problem. A factor based test will expand the
exception so that it becomes predictable in the way that the form versus
substance test is mercurial. Additionally, the proposed refinement is
congruent with the major import of the 1990 revisions to the UPC: to
adopt the intent theory within subsection (a)(5).131 A refined exception
may even prompt some jurisdictions to finally retire the form and substance test as applied to cases involving the unique situation of replacement property. Finally, and possibly most importantly, the proposed
factor test will continue to safeguard the primary purpose of wills law:
effectuating testamentary intent.

131

UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-606 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).

